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1 Introduction
A patent protects the patent-holder from firms copying its product. In other words, patents
restrict entry of homogeneous (identical) products for a given period, and thus provide the
holder with some market power. It is important to notice, though, that patents seldom
lead to a complete monopolisation of a market. In most cases, a patent just implies that
competing products must be suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. Markets with patented products
are thus typically characterised as oligopolistic markets with diﬀerentiated products.
The rationale behind patents is to stimulate firms to undertake R&D investments to
discover new products by granting some degree of market power and thus returns on the
investments. A generous patent system is likely to stimulate innovation strongly. However,
there may be a flip-side of the coin. A generous patent system may also induce patent-
holding firms to exhibit market power in a potentially detrimental way. In particular,
patents may provide incentives for patent-holding firms not only to spend resources on
R&D to obtain new patents, but also to spend resources on marketing to protect existing
patents, thereby reducing the probability of increased future competition. This is the
basic idea that we explore in the present paper. In a model framework designed to fit the
pharmaceutical industry, we analyse in detail how a patent-holding pharmaceutical firm
may strategically use advertising ex ante to aﬀect the R&D investments in new drugs, and
thereby aﬀect the probability distribution of future market structures.
Some simple stylised facts suggest that the problems addressed in this paper are poten-
tially highly relevant for the pharmaceutical industry. In this industry patents of chemical
compounds play a crucial role in terms of stimulating developments of new drugs. Con-
sequently, the pharmaceutical industry is very R&D-intensive. However, this industry is
also one of the most advertising-intensive industries (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Marketing
expenditures typically amount to 20-40 percent of sales revenues, often exceeding R&D
expenditures. According to Schweitzer (1997) the marketing expenses for three of the
largest US pharmaceutical companies — Merck, Pfizer, and Eli Lilly — ranged from 21 to
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40% of annual sales revenues, while the R&D expenses varied between 11 and 15%.1 The
importance of non-price strategies in the pharmaceutical market may be explained by the
fact that most countries exert some sort of price control either directly by regulating the
prices or indirectly via the reimbursement system. In addition, the demand for phar-
maceuticals is highly price inelastic, mainly due to health insurance and/or physicians’
ignorance of price in the prescription choice.
To analyse the interaction between pharmaceutical advertising and R&D, we consider
a therapeutic market with potentially two horizontally diﬀerentiated products. We assume
that one of the products — the ‘breakthrough’ drug — has already been developed, and is
advertised and sold by an incumbent monopolist. The second product may or may not
be discovered, depending on the amount of R&D investments incurred. In the R&D race
there are two competitors: the incumbent monopolist and a potential entrant. Thus, there
are potentially three diﬀerent ex post market structures: (i) single-product monopoly if
neither firm discovers the second product; (ii) multi-product monopoly if the incumbent
wins the R&D race; and (iii) a duopoly if the entrant wins the R&D race. In line with the
specific features of pharmaceutical markets, we focus exclusively on non-price strategies,
where the firms face exogenous (regulated) drug prices and use advertising to induce
demand.2 The key mechanism in the relationship between advertising and R&D incentives
is the incumbent’s ability to influence ex post payoﬀs of the potential entrant through ex
ante advertising of the existing product.3 The model is analysed both within a general
framework and in a standard informative advertising application.
We focus on innovations of competing products (non-drastic innovations), and not
on innovations of completely new products (drastic innovations). In the pharmaceuti-
cal industry a patent is granted for a drug’s novel chemical composition rather than its
1Similar figures are reported from Novartis and Aventis, the largest pharmaceutical companies in Eu-
rope. See also Zweifel and Breyer (1997) for figures for Germany and Switzerland.
2Although this assumption is most appropriate in pharmaceutical markets, where demand is highly
price-inelastic and drug prices are subject to price regulation in most countries, there are several papers on
patents with a more general applicability that abstract from pricing strategies, see, e.g., Needham (1976),
Waterson (1990) and Langinier (2004).
3This mechanism was observed by Needham (1976), who argued that an incumbent’s pre-entry advertis-
ing influences the entry decision only if there is some link between pre-entry advertising and the entrant’s
post-entry expected profits.
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therapeutic properties. Many new pharmaceuticals receive patents despite their being
functionally similar to existing drugs. As such, their introduction expands physicians’
choices and can pose a competitive threat to established drugs with the same or similar
indications. Lu and Comanor (1998) find that all but 13 of 148 new branded chemical
entities introduced in the US between 1978-87 had at least one fairly close substitute;
the average number of substitutes being 1.86. Scherer (2000) reports that the number of
drugs per symptom group ranged from 1 to 50, with a median of 5 drugs and a mean of
6.04. Thus, empirical evidence clearly demonstrates the importance of non-drastic product
innovations.
Within a fairly general framework, we show that advertising and R&D are substitute
strategies for the incumbent firm — implying that more advertising will, all else equal,
induce the incumbent to spend less on R&D — if the following two conditions are met, in
equilibrium: (i) the second-order cross derivatives of demand with respect to advertising
expenditures are negative (implying that advertising expenditures are strategic substi-
tutes), and (ii) the second-order cross derivatives of the innovation success functions are
suﬃciently small in absolute terms. Under these general conditions, we show that the
incumbent has an incentive to strategically overinvest in advertising in order to nega-
tively aﬀect R&D investments and thereby protect its existing patent rent. Applying the
general framework within a standard informative advertising model, as introduced by But-
ters (1977), we show that such overinvestment incentives are always present, and we also
demonstrate that a generous patent system (equivalently, generous drug prices) tends to
stimulate marketing incentives, relative to R&D incentives.
Finally, we extend the informative advertising example to discuss some welfare and
policy implications. In particular, we analyse welfare eﬀects of a stricter regulation on
advertising and a more generous patent system.4 These issues are especially relevant for
the pharmaceutical industry, since most countries impose regulations on both market-
4Applying the informative advertising model, we take the most positive view of advertising. If we
assumed advertising to be purely persuasive, a complete ban on advertising is more likely to be socially
beneficial. In most cases, including pharmaceutical marketing, advertising contains elements of both
persuasion and information.
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ing and prices of prescription drugs. Based on the informative advertising example, we
present numerical simulations suggesting that strict regulation of advertising and strict
price regulation (or, equivalently, a less generous patent system) are policy substitutes.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we give an overview
of related literature. We present the general framework in Section 3, and derive the
equilibrium in terms of advertising and R&D investments in Section 4. In Section 5
we illustrate our model by analysing a standard (parameterised) informative advertising
model, which is extended in Section 6 to include some discussion of welfare and policy
implications. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 7.
2 Related literature
Although there are, to our knowledge, no previous studies of the strategic link between
advertising and R&D, our paper is clearly related to the literature on advertising and
entry. In his seminal paper, Schmalensee (1983) considers a homogenous-product market
served by an incumbent with a potential entrant. He analyses the following three-stage
game: at stage 1 the incumbent sends out ads to consumers; at stage 2 the entrant decides
whether or not to enter, and, if entry occurs, the entrant sends out its own ads. Finally, at
stage 3 active firms play some simultaneous-move oligopoly game.5 The main result is that
the incumbent can deter entry, but does so by strategically under-investing in advertising.
Another seminal paper is Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). They assume products to be
diﬀerentiated, and analyse the following two-period model: in the first (pre-entry) period,
the incumbent chooses a fraction of consumers to inform, which becomes the incumbent’s
captive market. In the second period, the incumbent and the entrant compete for the
non-captive market through price competition. They find that the incumbent firm will
under-invest in advertising (‘lean and hungry look’) if it chooses to deter entry, because
this establishes a credible threat to cut prices in the event of entry. Conversely, if the
5Schmalensee (1983) observes that if entry occurs and firms set prices, then a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium does not exist. Accordingly, he assumes that firms compete in quantities. Ishigaki (2000)
characterises the mixed-strategy pricing equilibria induced by entry, and finds that entry is either blockaded
or accommodated.
5
established firm chooses to allow entry, it will advertise heavily and become a ‘fat cat’ in
order to soften the entrant’s pricing behaviour.
Together, these papers suggest the following striking conclusion: the incumbent firm
does not deter entry by investing more in advertising than it would have done if there
were no threat of entry.6 Thus, there is no formal support for strategic over-investment in
advertising by the incumbent firm. Notice that the incumbent can credibly threaten not to
decrease its investment since such reductions are infeasible. In these models, advertising
is a durable investment since buyers never forget the ads they receive. However, the
incumbent can always increase its advertising ex post if this is profitable. This raises
a concern whether the incumbent can credibly commit to under-invest in advertising.
Schmalensee (1983) observes this problem, but avoids it by making restrictions on the
incumbent’s advertising choices.7 Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) also avoids this problem
simply by making second-period advertising exogenous.
The present paper diﬀers from the above mentioned contributions in several respects.
Our model is not an entry model as such, but entry is one possible outcome of an R&D
contest. Furthermore, by focusing on non-price competition we establish incentives for
over-investment in advertising by the incumbent firm, which contrasts with results for
entry deterrence under price or quantity competition, as previously discussed. In doing
so, we also enforce dynamic consistency by allowing the incumbent to re-optimise its
advertising investment ex post. More precisely, if it is profitable for the incumbent to
advertise more heavily if entry occurs than if not, then it is never credible for the incumbent
to under-invest in advertising ex ante. The potential entrant will foresee this and base its
decision on the ex post advertising level.
Our paper also relates to more specific studies of pharmaceutical markets. In this field,
the issue of advertising and entry has received considerable attention for a long period,
especially from empirical studies, see, e.g., Hurwitz and Caves (1988), Caves et al. (1991),
6Despite several similarities, this result is contrary to the production capacity literature. For instance,
Dixit (1980) shows that the incumbent strategically overinvests in capacity in order to deter entry.
7The assumption that the incumbent can credibly commit not to increase its advertising after entry, is
justified by Schmalensee (1983) as follows: "Under some conditions, destruction of the materials necessary
to print more leaflets may serve to accomplish this" (p. 647). This justification is certainly debatable.
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Grabowski and Vernon (1992), and Scott Morton (2000). A common finding is that there
is no evidence of entry deterring behaviour on the part of incumbents. However, all these
papers are concerned about branded vs. generic competition, which means that they
are considering competition between homogenous or ‘artificially’ vertically diﬀerentiated
products.8 To our best knowledge, there is no study that analyses advertising as a device
for restricting competition between branded (or patented) products, nor the eﬀect of
advertising on R&D investments.
Finally, our paper relates to the literature on patent races, and especially, that on
monopoly persistence. The issue — which has been addressed by Gilbert and Newberry
(1982) and Reinganum (1983), among others — is whether a monopolist in the product
market is more likely to innovate than an entrant. The basic result from this literature
is two-fold: (i) if the innovation is drastic, then it is more likely with entry into the
product market; (ii) if innovation is non-drastic, then it is more likely for the monopoly
to persist.9 This literature is mainly on process innovations. Since we consider non-
drastic product innovations, the parallels are not straightforward. However, in a loose
sense, our paper contributes to this literature by providing an alternative explanation
for monopoly persistence, namely that the incumbent can use advertising to reduce the
entrant’s incentive to spend resources on R&D.
3 A general model
Consider a therapeutic market with potentially two horizontally diﬀerentiated patented
products (prescription drugs). One of the products — the ‘breakthrough’ drug — has already
been developed by firm 1. The second (horizontally diﬀerentiated) product may or may
not be discovered, depending on the amount of R&D investments incurred. We assume
8Generic drugs are chemically identical products to the original brand-name drug. However, all the
mentioned empirical studies strongly suggest that generics are not de facto perfect substitutes to the original
brand-name drug. It turns out that a vertical diﬀerentiation model, where the generics are perceived to be
of lower quality than the brand-name drug, produces results that fit the empirical observations well (see,
e.g., Cabrales, 2003, Königbauer, 2004, Brekke et al., 2005).
9A related paper is Langinier (2004) who examines the role of patents — or more precisely patent
renewals — as strategic barriers to entry, depending on the information structure.
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that firm 1 faces competition from a potential entrant — firm 2 — in the race to discover
the new drug.
We consider a two-period model with the following sequence of events:
Stage 1a: The incumbent advertises and sells the existing drug.
Stage 1b: The incumbent and the potential entrant simultaneously invest in R&D to
develop a new drug.
Stage 2: The new drug — if discovered — is advertised by the patent holder and sold in
the market alongside the already existing drug.
Stages 1a and 1b constitute the first period, where the incumbent is a monopolist in
the market. The breakthrough product (drug 1) is sold in both periods, whereas the new
product (drug 2) — if discovered — is sold in the second period only. Thus, while the first-
period is a single-product monopoly phase, the second period is characterised by one of
three diﬀerent market structures: (i) a single-product monopoly if neither firm discovers
the second product; (ii) a multi-product monopoly if the incumbent wins the R&D race;
and (iii) a duopoly if the entrant wins the R&D race.
Drug demand
Due to the extensive prevalence of third-party payment for prescription drugs in most
countries, which implies that drug demand is highly price-inelastic10, we make the as-
sumption that demand for a particular drug depends only on the amounts of advertising
for the existing drugs within the therapeutic market. More specifically, if we let Ai denote
the amount of advertising for drug i, the demand for this drug in the second period is
given by a function
Di (Ai, Aj) , i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j,
where
∂Di
∂Ai
> 0,
∂2Di
∂A2i
≤ 0, ∂Di
∂Aj
< 0 and
∂Di
∂Ai
>
¯¯¯¯
∂Dj
∂Ai
¯¯¯¯
.
10See, e.g., Rizzo (1999) and Scherer (2000).
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These assumptions on the demand function imply that advertising has both a market
expanding and a business stealing eﬀect. In the first period — the single-product monopoly
phase — demand for drug 1 is given by
θD1 (A1, 0) ,
where θ > 0. Thus, the parameter θ reflects the importance (length) of the first period,
relative to the second.
Advertising
A key assumption in our analysis is that the eﬀects of advertising persist over time.
As is common in the literature on strategic advertising, we take this assumption to the
extreme by letting the eﬀects of advertising on demand be infinitely durable.11 The firm
producing drug i can invest in an advertising stock Ai for this product at a cost
K (Ai) ,
where
K 0 (Ai) > 0, K 00 (Ai) > 0 and K (0) = 0.
Thus, we assume that both firms possess the same advertising technology.
R&D
During the monopoly phase, the incumbent and the potential entrant compete in
terms of R&D to develop a new (horizontally diﬀerentiated) drug in the market. Game-
theoretically, we assume that R&D investments are made simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
If we denote the amount of R&D investment of firm i by xi, the probability of success for
11See, e.g., Schmalensee (1983), Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), etc. See
also Brekke and Kuhn (2005) for an application to the pharmaceutical industry. As will be discussed
in Section 7, our results only need some degree of advertising persistence. The assumption of infinite
durability is just a simplification, making the analysis more tractable.
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firm i in the R&D contest is given by a function
zi (xi, xj) , i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j,
By ‘success’ we mean that firm i will develop and obtain a patent for the new drug. We
assume that z1 + z2 ≤ 1, accommodating the possibility that the new drug will not be
developed. The R&D success function is assumed to have the following general character-
istics:
∂zi
∂xi
> 0,
∂zi
∂xj
< 0,
∂2zi
∂x2i
≤ 0, ∂
2zi
∂x2j
≥ 0 and ∂zi
∂xi
>
¯¯¯¯
∂zi
∂xj
¯¯¯¯
.
The last assumption essentially means that increased R&D eﬀort by either firm will always
increase the overall probability that a new drug is developed. The cost of exerting an R&D
eﬀort of xi is given by a function
C (xi) ,
where
C 0 (xi) > 0, C 00 (xi) > 0 and C (0) = 0.
Profits
As already mentioned, markets for prescription drugs are predominantly characterised
by highly price inelastic demand, mainly due to extensive third-party payment and highly
asymmetric information in the physician-patient relationship. As a consequence, prescrip-
tion drugs are, in most countries, subject to some kind of price regulation. In the present
model, we therefore make the assumption that the firms face exogenous drug prices, which
seems a reasonable approximation to the above mentioned particular features. More specif-
ically, we assume that the firms face a regulated drug price p, which — for simplicity — is
assumed to be equal for both drugs.12 Note that, since demand is insensitive to price
changes, a price increase is equivalent to a demand increase. Thus, an increase in p can
12Equal prices for both drugs might be a reasonable assumption in the case of horizontally diﬀerentiated
drugs with equivalent therapeutic benefits. In the last section of the paper, we briefly discuss how diﬀerent
drug prices might aﬀect our results.
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also be interpreted as being equivalent to an increase in the patent length. Whether we
use this interpretation, or explicitly acknowledge that the regulated drug price is an in-
tegral part of patent protection for pharmaceuticals, we can (loosely) think of p as the
‘generosity’ of the patent system.
We abstract from production costs once a new drug has been developed, implying that
all costs of the pharmaceutical firms are related to marketing and R&D. In line with the
specific features of the pharmaceutical industry — where marginal production costs are
very low — we also disregard the possibility of capacity constraints, and assume that firms
will always supply the quantity demanded, as long as the price covers marginal production
costs (i.e., p ≥ 0).
Second period profits for firm i in market structure z is denoted V zi , where i = 1, 2,
and z = S(ingle-product monopoly), M(ulti-product monopoly), D(uopoly). Assuming
dynamic consistency, i.e., that the incumbent has no incentive to increase advertising of
the original product ex post, second period profits are given by13
V S1 = pD1 (A1, 0) , (1)
VM1 = p [D1 (A1, A2) +D2 (A1, A2)]−K (A2) , (2)
V D1 = pD1 (A1, A2) , (3)
V D2 = pD2 (A1, A2)−K (A2) . (4)
Since the market structure in the second period depends on the outcome of the R&D
contest, expected second period profits for firm i, denoted Bi, are given by
B1 = [1− z1 (x1, x2)− z2 (x1, x2)]V S1 + z1 (x1, x2)VM1 + z2 (x1, x2)V D1 − C (x1) , (5)
B2 = z2 (x1, x2)V D2 − C (x2) . (6)
13 In general, a suﬃciently high value of θ will always ensure that this is indeed the case. This will be
made clearer below.
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Expected present-value profits for the incumbent firm at the outset of the game, denoted
Π1, are consequently given by14
Π1 = θV S1 +B1 −K (A1) . (7)
4 Analysis
We look for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the above described game, solving
the model by backwards induction. We start, then, by analysing second-period advertising
of the new product: drug 2.
4.1 Second-period advertising
The introduction of a new product gives rise to one of potentially two new market struc-
tures, depending on which firm develops the new product:
Duopoly
If the entrant obtains the patent for the new product, it chooses a level of advertising,
AD2 , that maximises profits for firm 2, given by (4). The first-order condition for optimal
advertising of the new product is then given by
p
∂D2 (A1, A2)
∂A2
− ∂K (A2)
∂A2
= 0, (8)
which defines a best response function AD2 (A1). By total diﬀerentiation of (8), we can
easily obtain
∂AD2 (A1)
∂A1
=
−p ∂2D2∂A1∂A2
p∂
2D2
∂A22
− ∂2K∂A22
.
Applying the second-order condition, we see that
∂AD2 (A1)
∂A1
< 0 if
∂2D2
∂A1∂A2
< 0.
14Discounting between periods is captured by the parameter θ.
12
In this case the decision variables are strategic substitutes15, implying that increased first-
period advertising by the incumbent will reduce the optimal second-period advertising by
the entrant.
Monopoly
If the new product is developed by the incumbent, the optimal level of advertising for
this product, AM2 , maximises the incumbent’s second-period profits, given by (2). The
first-order condition is then given by
p
µ
∂D1 (A1, A2)
∂A2
+
∂D2 (A1, A2)
∂A2
¶
− ∂K (A2)
∂A2
= 0, (9)
which defines a best response function AM2 (A1). Comparing (8) and (9), we see that the
multi-product monopolist internalises the business-stealing eﬀect of advertising, implying
that
AM2 (A1) < A
D
2 (A1) .
Once more, by total diﬀerentiation of (9) we derive
∂AM2 (A1)
∂A1
=
−p
³
∂2D1
∂A1∂A2 +
∂2D2
∂A1∂A2
´
p
³
∂D21
∂A22
+ ∂
2D2
∂A22
´
− ∂2K∂A22
.
Equivalent to the duopoly case, we see that
∂AM2 (A1)
∂A1
< 0 if
∂2Di
∂Ai∂Aj
< 0.
For the remainder of the analysis, we will generally assume that advertising investments
are strategic substitutes for the firms.
15See Bulow et al. (1985).
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4.2 The eﬀects of first-period advertising on second-period profits
By inserting the equilibrium levels of second-period advertising in the second-period profit
expressions, (1)-(4), we derive equilibrium second-period profits for firm i in market struc-
ture z as a function of first-period advertising for the incumbent product; V zi (A1). The
properties of the demand functions — where advertising has both a market expanding
and a business-stealing eﬀect — implies the following ranking of equilibrium second-period
profits:
VM1 (A1) > V
S
1 (A1) > V
D
1 (A1) .
In words: for any level of first-period advertising, the introduction of a new drug in
the therapeutic market is beneficial for the incumbent if the drug is developed by the
incumbent himself, but detrimental for the incumbent if the drug is developed by a new
entrant.
A key mechanism of the model is that first-period advertising by the incumbent aﬀects
second-period profits for both firms. Applying the Envelope Theorem, the eﬀects of first-
period advertising on second-period profits are easily derived:
∂V S1 (A1)
∂A1
= p
∂D1 (A1, 0)
∂A1
> 0, (10)
∂VM1 (A1)
∂A1
= p[
∂D1
¡
A1, AM2
¢
∂A1
+
∂D2
¡
A1, AM2
¢
∂A1
] > 0, (11)
∂V D1 (A1)
∂A1
= p
"
∂D1
¡
A1, AD2
¢
∂A1
+
∂D1
¡
A1, AD2
¢
∂A2
∂AD2
∂A1
#
> 0, (12)
∂V D2 (A1)
∂A1
= p
∂D2
¡
A1, AD2
¢
∂A1
< 0. (13)
As we observe from (13), first-period advertising by the incumbent directly reduces the
second-period payoﬀ of the entrant. In addition, if advertising decisions are strategic
substitutes, the incumbent has a strategic first-mover advantage which enables him to shift
second period duopoly rents from the possible entrant through first-period advertising.
This eﬀect is reflected in the second term of (12).
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With the assumptions of ∂Di/∂Aj < 0 and ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj < 0, it follows from (10)-(12)
that
∂V S1 (A1)
∂A1
>
∂VM1 (A1)
∂A1
(14)
and
∂V D1 (A1)
∂A1
>
∂VM1 (A1)
∂A1
. (15)
The latter inequality implies that first-period advertising has a larger positive eﬀect on
the incumbent’s second-period profits in duopoly than in multi-product monopoly. This
follows from the internalisation of the business-stealing eﬀect in multi-product monopoly
(i.e., ∂Di/∂Aj < 0) and the first-mover advantage vis-à-vis the entrant in duopoly (i.e.,
∂AD2 /∂A1 < 0). This particular relationship between the marginal second-period eﬀects
of first-period advertising will prove crucial in the subsequent analysis.
4.3 R&D competition
During the monopoly phase, the incumbent and a potential entrant compete in terms
of R&D to develop a new, horizontally diﬀerentiated, drug in the market. For a given
level of advertising by the incumbent, each firm chooses the level of R&D that maximises
expected second-period payoﬀs, anticipating the equilibrium second-period outcome. Ex-
pected second-period profits are given by (5) and (6). For illustrative purposes, it may be
useful to re-arrange the expression for the incumbent’s expected second-period profits in
the following way:
B1 = V S1 + z1 (x1, x2)
£
VM1 − V S1
¤| {z }
Gain of winning
− z2 (x1, x2)
£
V S1 − V D1
¤| {z }
Loss of losing
− C (x1) . (16)
Thus, the incentive for the incumbent to undertake R&D investments can be decomposed
into two diﬀerent forces: (i) the profit gain derived from winning the R&D competition,
and (ii) the profit loss of losing the R&D competition.16
16Beath et al. (1989) label the first eﬀect as the ‘profit incentive’ and the second eﬀect as the ‘competitive
threat’. These also correspond to the ‘replacement eﬀect’ and the ‘eﬃciency eﬀect’ in Gilbert and Newberry
(1982) and Reinganum (1983).
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From (6) and (16), equilibrium R&D eﬀorts by the two firms are given by the solution
to the following pair of first-order conditions:
∂B1
∂x1
=
∂z1
∂x1
¡
VM1 − V S1
¢
− ∂z2
∂x1
¡
V S1 − V D1
¢
− ∂C
∂x1
= 0, (17)
∂B2
∂x2
=
∂z2
∂x2
V D2 −
∂C
∂x2
= 0. (18)
Our assumptions on zi (·) and C (·) ensure that the second-order conditions are met.17 We
also assume that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix,
J =
⎡
⎢⎣
∂2B1/∂x21 ∂
2B1/∂x1∂x2
∂2B2/∂x2∂x1 ∂2B2/∂x22
⎤
⎥⎦ ,
is positive, guaranteeing uniqueness of the equilibrium.18
4.4 The eﬀects of first-period advertising on R&D incentives
The first-order conditions (17)-(18) implicitly define the optimal R&D eﬀorts of firm 1 and
2 as functions of the first-period investment level by the incumbent: x∗1 (A1) and x
∗
2 (A1),
respectively. How do R&D incentives depend on first-period advertising? Using Cramer’s
Rule, we can derive expressions for ∂x∗1/∂A1 and ∂x
∗
2/∂A1 from the first-order conditions
of the R&D game:
∂x∗1
∂A1
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ −∂2B1/∂A1∂x1 ∂2B1/∂x1∂x2
−∂2B2/∂A1∂x2 ∂2B2/∂x22
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
|J | , (19)
17The second-order conditions are given by
∂2B1
∂x21
=
∂2z1
∂x21
³
VM1 − V S1
´
− ∂
2z2
∂x21
³
V S1 − V D1
´
− ∂
2C
∂x21
< 0,
∂2B2
∂x22
=
∂2z2
∂x22
V D2 −
∂2C
∂x21
< 0.
18See the Appendix for an explicit expression of |J |, with the corresponding condition for |J | > 0.
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∂x∗2
∂A1
=
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ ∂2B1/∂x21 −∂2B1/∂A1∂x1
∂2B2/∂x2∂x1 −∂2B2/∂A1∂x2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
|J | . (20)
From |J | > 0, it follows that
sign
µ
∂x∗1
∂A1
¶
= sign
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−Ω
⎛
⎝∂
2z2
∂x22
V D2 −
∂2C
∂x22| {z }
⎞
⎠
<0
+Φ
∂z2
∂x2
∂V D2
∂A1| {z }
<0
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(21)
and
sign
µ
∂x∗2
∂A1
¶
= sign
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
−∂
2B1
∂x21
∂z2
∂x2
∂V D2
∂A1| {z }
>0
+Ω
∂2z2
∂x1∂x2
V D2| {z }
≶0
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
, (22)
where
Ω :=
∂z1
∂x1
µ
∂VM1
∂A1
− ∂V
S
1
∂A1
¶
− ∂z2
∂x1
µ
∂V S1
∂A1
− ∂V
D
1
∂A1
¶
< 0,
Φ :=
∂2z1
∂x2∂x1
¡
VM1 − V S1
¢
− ∂
2z2
∂x2∂x1
¡
V S1 − V D1
¢ ≶ 0.
An increase in first-period advertising by the incumbent has a direct and (potentially)
an indirect eﬀect on R&D eﬀorts of both firms, and we see that the sign of the overall
eﬀect is generally ambiguous in both cases. The direct eﬀects of increased advertising are
unambiguously negative with respect to R&D eﬀorts for both firms. Increased advertising
by the incumbent directly reduces the second-period payoﬀ of firm 2 — as can be seen from
(13) — and thus reduces the incentives for the potential entrant to exert eﬀort in the R&D
contest. This eﬀect is reflected in the first term of (22). Increased advertising for the
existing product also directly reduces the incentives to invest in R&D for the incumbent,
because such advertising reduces the gain of winning the contest by more than a potential
increase in the loss of losing. This follows from (14)-(15), and is reflected in the first term
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of (21).19
If ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj = 0, the direct eﬀects unambiguously ensure that increased advertising
of the breakthrough product will reduce the R&D incentives for both firms. However,
if ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj 6= 0 there are additional indirect eﬀects that could work in the opposite
direction. The second terms in (21) and (22) reflect that a lower amount of R&D by firm
i could — ceteris paribus — spur increased R&D investments by firm j if R&D eﬀorts are
strategic substitutes; that is, if ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj < 0.
From the above analysis, we can thus characterise the relationship between first-period
advertising and R&D investments as follows:
Proposition 1 Assume that advertising investments are strategic substitutes for the firms;
∂2Di(Ai,Aj)
∂Ai∂Aj
< 0. Then the following results obtain:
(i) ∂x
∗
1
∂A1 < 0 if
¯¯¯¯
∂2zi(x∗i ,x∗j)
∂xi∂xj
¯¯¯¯
is suﬃciently small.
(ii) ∂x
∗
2
∂A1 < 0 if
∂2zi(x∗i ,x∗j)
∂xi∂xj
≥ 0 or
¯¯¯¯
∂2zi(x∗i ,x∗j)
∂xi∂xj
¯¯¯¯
is suﬃciently small.
The first part of the proposition establishes the conditions for advertising and R&D
being substitute strategies for the incumbent firm, implying that more resources spent on
advertising will lead to less resources spent on R&D. This will be the case if advertising
investments are strategic substitutes and the second-order cross derivatives of the innova-
tion success functions are suﬃciently small in absolute value in equilibrium.20 Since the
condition for the second part of the proposition is less restrictive, the following implication
holds:
Corollary 1 Increased first-period advertising by the incumbent reduces the probability
that a new product is developed and introduced on the market if ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj < 0 and¯¯
∂2zi/∂xi∂xj
¯¯
is suﬃciently small.
19 It follows from (14)-(15) that ¯¯¯¯
¯∂
¡
VM1 − V S1
¢
∂A1
¯¯¯¯
¯ > ∂
¡
V S1 − V D1
¢
∂A1
.
Note also that (14)-(15) together with ∂zi/∂xi > |∂zi/∂xj | ensure that Ω < 0.
20Note that this is also the condition, in qualitative terms, for |J | > 0. See the Appendix for further
details.
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4.5 First-period advertising
At the outset of the game, the incumbent chooses the optimal level of advertising for the
existing patented drug by maximising expected present-value profits over the two periods,
given by (7), anticipating the outcome of the R&D game and the subsequent market
equilibria in the second period. Thus, optimal first-period advertising is given by
A∗1 = argmax
©
Π1 (A1) = θV S1 (A1) +B1 (x
∗
1 (A1) , x
∗
1 (A1) , A1)−K (A1)
ª
. (23)
As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering the case of exogenous
probabilities of second-period market structures. In this case, the first-order condition for
optimal advertising is given by
(1 + θ)
∂V S1
∂A1
− z1
µ
∂V S1
∂A1
− ∂V
M
1
∂A1
¶
− z2
µ
∂V S1
∂A1
− ∂V
D
1
∂A1
¶
− ∂K
∂A1
= 0. (24)
When deciding the optimal level of first-period advertising, the incumbent has to con-
sider the marginal second-period benefits of increased advertising in the diﬀerent market
structures, and weigh these net benefits with the relevant probabilities. We see that a suf-
ficiently high value of θ will ensure dynamic consistency, in the sense that the incumbent
has no incentives to increase advertising of drug 1 in the second-period.21
In the following, we define overinvestment in advertising as an advertising level in
excess of the level given by the above benchmark. In other words, we say that an incumbent
firm overinvests in advertising if it advertises more than it would have done if advertising
and R&D decisions were unrelated, implying that the R&D probabilities (z1 and z2) were
exogenous with respect to the first-period advertising decision.
Let us now turn to the case of endogenous probabilities, determined by the absolute
and relative R&D eﬀorts of the firms. From (23), the first-order condition for an optimal
21 In the parametric example presented in the next section, we demonstrate that dynamic consistency
can be ensured by a very low value of θ. It is important to note that while θ plays a role with respect
to the dynamic consistency of the model, it is otherwise irrelevant for qualitative nature of all the results
derived in the paper.
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level of first-period advertising can be conceptualised and expressed as follows:
∂Π1 (A1)
∂A1
= Direct rent eﬀect + Strategic R&D eﬀect = 0,
where the Direct rent eﬀect is equal to the left-hand side of (24), whereas the Strategic
R&D eﬀect is given by
µ
∂z1
∂x1
∂x∗1
∂A1
+
∂z1
∂x2
∂x∗2
∂A1
¶¡
VM1 − V S1
¢
(25)
+
µ
∂z2
∂x1
∂x∗1
∂A1
+
∂z2
∂x2
∂x∗2
∂A1
¶¡
V D1 − V S1
¢
− ∂C
∂x1
∂x∗1
∂A1
.
However, by using (17), (25) can be reduced to
∙
∂z1
∂x2
¡
VM1 − V S1
¢
− ∂z2
∂x2
¡
V S1 − V D1
¢¸ ∂x∗2
∂A1
. (26)
Since the expression in square brackets is unambiguously negative, it follows that the
Strategic R&D eﬀect is positive if and only if ∂x∗2/∂A1 < 0. Since our definition of
overinvestment is equivalent to a positive Strategic R&D eﬀect, the following result follows
immediately:
Proposition 2 The incumbent firm optimally overinvests in advertising if and only if
such advertising reduces the R&D eﬀort of the potential entrant.
As we can see from (26), the gain for the incumbent of inducing a lower R&D eﬀort from
the potential entrant — which provides the incentives for overinvestment — is constituted
by two parts. A lower value of x∗2 implies that the incumbent’s expected gain of winning
the contest, z1
¡
VM1 − V S1
¢
, is increased, while the expected loss of losing, z2
¡
V S1 − V D1
¢
,
is reduced. Thus, as long as first-period advertising by the incumbent reduces R&D eﬀorts
by the potential entrant, with the relevant conditions given in Proposition 1, incentives
for overinvestment are present.
20
5 An example: Informative advertising
In this section we illustrate our model by analysing a standard specific advertising model
that fits the assumptions of the general model. We consider an informative advertising
model with an information technology that follows Butters (1977).22 There is a unit mass
of potential consumers that are ex ante uninformed about the existence of the products
in the market, and rely on advertising to become informed. If a consumer receives one
or more ads for a particular product, she knows about the existence and attributes of
this product. We assume that, in the first period, informed consumers buy θ units of
the existing product, whereas, in the second period, informed consumers buy 1 unit of
one of the products in the market. With two products in the market, consumers who are
informed about both products buy either product with probability 12 .
23 If a fraction Ai
(Aj) of consumers are informed about drug i (j), second-period demand for drug i is given
by
Di (Ai, Aj) = Ai (1−Aj) +
AiAj
2
, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j. (27)
Note that ∂2Di/∂Ai∂Aj = −12 , implying that advertising choices are strategic substitutes
for the firms. We assume that a firm can inform a fraction Ai of the consumers about the
existence and attributes of drug i by incurring a cost of K (Ai) = k2A
2
i , Ai ∈ [0, 1].
We can now use the parameterised demand and cost functions to calculate second-
period payoﬀs in the diﬀerent market structures. Straightforward calculations yield
V S1 (A1) = pA1, (28)
VM1 (A1) = p
h
A1 +
p
2k
(1−A1)2
i
, (29)
V D1 (A1) = pA1
h
1− p
4k
(2−A1)
i
, (30)
22This approach has been widely used in the advertising literature. See, e.g., Schmalensee (1983),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Ishigaki (2000), Brekke and Kuhn (2005).
23We can interpret this as a Hotelling model with uniform distribution of consumers, symmetric location
of products and ads reaching consumers randomly.
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V D2 (A1) =
p2
8k
(2−A1)2 . (31)
In order to obtain analytical solutions in the R&D contest, we construct the success
functions in the following way. Let xi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that firm i discovers
the new product. If the product is only discovered by firm i, this firm will be granted a
patent for the product. However, if both firms discover the product, the patent will be
granted to either firm with probability 12 . This yields the following success functions:
24
zi (xi, xj) = xi (1− xj) +
xixj
2
, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j.
We assume that firm i can obtain a probability xi of discovery by undertaking an R&D
investment of C (xi) = c2x
2
i , xi ∈ [0, 1].
We can now insert these functional expressions into (6) and (16), and solve for the
optimal values of xi in the R&D competition:
x∗1 (A1) =
2p2
h
32ck (1−A1)2 − p2 [2− 3A1 (2−A1)] (2−A1)2
i
128c2k2 − p4 [2− 3A1 (2−A1)] (2−A1)2
, (32)
x∗2 (A1) =
4p2 (2−A1)2
h
4ck − p2 (1−A1)2
i
128c2k2 − p4 [2− 3A1 (2−A1)] (2−A1)2
. (33)
An interior solution requires a lower bound on the cost parameter c. It is relatively
straightforward to verify that c > c := p2/4k is a suﬃcient condition for x∗1 (A1) , x
∗
2 (A1) ∈
(0, 1) for A1 ∈ [0, 1]. From (32)-(33) we derive:
Proposition 3 In the informative advertising model, given that c > c, then
(i) x∗1 = x
∗
2 if A1 = 0,
(ii) x∗1 < x
∗
2 if A1 > 0, and
(iii) ∂x
∗
i
∂A1
< 0 for any A1 ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 2.
A proof is given in the Appendix.
24This particular success function has the following properties: ∂zi/∂xi > 0, ∂zi/∂xj < 0, ∂2zi/∂x2i =
∂2zi/∂x2j = 0 and ∂2zi/∂xi∂xj < 0.
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Proposition 3 shows that the incumbent will invest less aggressively in R&D than the
potential entrant. While the entrant’s R&D incentives are determined by the possibility
of duopoly profit only, the incumbent balances the profit gain of winning the R&D com-
petition against the profit loss of losing the R&D competition. Since the incumbent has
already secured some profits, due to being a single-product monopolist in the first period,
the net gain of winning the R&D competition is lower than for the entrant. However,
in the extreme case of no first-period advertising, both firms will invest equally much in
R&D. The reason is simply that for A1 = 0, single-product monopoly profits are also zero,
implying that the incumbent and the entrant face identical expected profit gains from
winning from the R&D competition.
The proposition also confirms that the general conditions given in Proposition 1 are
always satisfied in the informative advertising model, implying that marketing and R&D
are substitute strategies for the incumbent, and a lower level of first-period advertising
will increase overall R&D expenditures. By combining Propositions 2 and 3, we also see
that the informative advertising model yields strategic overinvestment in advertising by
the incumbent.
Turning now to the first-period advertising decision and the equilibrium outcome of
the full game, the complexity of the model makes analytical solutions infeasible. Instead,
we present the results in the form of numerical examples where we set θ = 110 .
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1—3 report equilibrium values of first-period advertising and R&D investments for diﬀerent
values of the key parameters k, c and p. In Table 4, we present measures of the incumbent’s
incentives to use advertising strategically in order to aﬀect R&D expenditures. We do so
by evaluating the Strategic R&D eﬀect, defined by (26), in equilibrium, which measures
the degree of overinvestment in first-period advertising. Table 4 reveals that the incentives
for overinvestment are increasing in p and decreasing in k and c.
25 It is straightforward to verify that the model is dynamically consistent even for this low level of θ. In
the informative advertising model, the incumbent has no incentives to increase advertising of drug 1 in
the second period if A∗1 ≥ pk . From Table 1 we see that this condition is always satisfied. The eﬀect of a
higher value of θ is essentially to increase first-period advertising and reduce R&D incentives.
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Table 1: A∗1.
c = 1 c = 3
p k = 5 k = 8 k = 5 k = 8
1 0.217 0.137 0.219 0.137
2 0.426 0.267 0.435 0.272
3 0.656 0.393 0.662 0.406
4 0.977 0.522 0.918 0.543
Table 2: x∗1.
c = 1 c = 3
p k = 5 k = 8 k = 5 k = 8
1 0.060 0.046 0.020 0.015
2 0.132 0.128 0.043 0.043
3 0.161 0.203 0.041 0.066
4 0.155 0.266 0.024 0.075
Table 3: x∗2.
c = 1 c = 3
p k = 5 k = 8 k = 5 k = 8
1 0.077 0.053 0.026 0.018
2 0.231 0.176 0.080 0.061
3 0.374 0.327 0.132 0.115
4 0.386 0.473 0.154 0.170
Table 4: Strategic R&D eﬀect .
c = 1 c = 3
p k = 5 k = 8 k = 5 k = 8
1 0.002 0 0.001 0
2 0.033 0.011 0.013 0.004
3 0.169 0.057 0.072 0.024
4 0.506 0.169 0.217 0.081
Although we restrict ourselves to a relatively small set of numerical examples, several
regularities can be identified that shed some light on the mechanisms of the model.26 We
concentrate here on the eﬀects of prices and costs on first-period advertising and R&D
expenditures. Consider first the eﬀects of an increase in marketing costs (k). This always
leads to a reduction of first-period advertising, through the direct cost eﬀect. R&D eﬀorts
are ambiguously aﬀected, though, due to an interaction of two opposing eﬀects. On the
one hand, reduced first-period advertising — ceteris paribus — increases R&D incentives,
as we have analysed in great detail in Section 4.4. On the other hand, higher advertising
costs also reduce second-period profits, since the new product has to be advertised. This
will — all else equal — reduce R&D incentives. From our numerical examples, we observe
26Other simulations with diﬀerent parameter values yield a qualitatively similar picture.
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that the first eﬀect dominates only for relatively high values of p.
The eﬀect of increased R&D costs (c) reduces R&D eﬀorts directly, but the eﬀect on
first-period advertising is ambiguous. We see that, for most of the reported parameter
values, advertising investments will increase (although by quite small amounts). In our
examples, the exception is for the combination of high price and low advertising costs.
In this case the incumbent has very strong incentives to advertise in order to protect his
monopoly position (which is very profitable due to the high price), and these incentives
are particularly strong for low R&D costs, which (all else equal) increases the probability
that a competitor will enter the market.
More interesting, perhaps, are the eﬀects of a higher drug price (p). A price increase
will increase first-period advertising simply because it makes the monopoly position more
valuable for the incumbent patent holder. Consequently, the incumbent will have stronger
incentives to use advertising strategically in order to protect his monopoly rent. Never-
theless, the potential entrant will react to a higher price by increasing his R&D eﬀorts.
This is due to the fact that a higher price not only increases the value of the existent
patent, it also increases the value of obtaining the second patent in the market. Thus,
the increased advertising eﬀorts by the incumbent have only a dampening eﬀect on the
competitor’s R&D expenditures. The eﬀect of a higher price on the incumbent’s R&D
eﬀorts is ambiguous, though. Ceteris paribus, more advertising of the existing product
will reduce the incumbent’s incentives for R&D. However, a higher p also increases the
value of the contested prize, which — all else equal — leads to increased R&D eﬀorts by
both firms. From Table 2 we see that the second eﬀect dominates when advertising costs
are high, implying that it is more costly to use advertising as a means to reduce R&D
investments. For lower advertising costs, on the other hand, there appears to be a hump-
shaped relationship between p and x∗1. For a suﬃciently high price, a further price increase
will trigger an increase in advertising that is suﬃciently strong to reduce the incumbent’s
R&D investments.
In our numerical examples, although the incumbent’s R&D eﬀorts may decrease, ag-
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gregate R&D expenditures always increase as a result of a higher price. This is confirmed
by comparing Tables 2 and 3. However, a higher price — or, generally, a more generous
patent protection — implies that a larger share of the patent rent is spent on marketing,
relative to R&D. This is a key result. Indeed, we see from Tables 2 and 3 that raising p
above a certain level hardly stimulates aggregate R&D expenditures at all, while incentives
for advertising increase considerably.
6 Some welfare and policy implications
In most countries there exist a wide set of restrictions on drug marketing. For instance,
direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs is prohibited in almost every west-
ern country, except for the US and New Zealand. Moreover, there exist ethical guidelines
regulating the interaction between medical doctors and sales representatives from the phar-
maceutical companies. Health authorities also usually require that a disclaimer stating the
eﬀectiveness, side-eﬀects, contraindications, etc., is printed along with an advertisement
of a drug. In this section of the paper, we extend the numerical example of the previous
section in order to make a contribution — albeit a tentative one — to the discussion of if and
when strict regulation of drug advertising is justified from a viewpoint of social welfare.
Advertising and welfare is often a methodologically complicated issue, in particular
if advertising contains elements of persuasion, which may potentially change individuals’
preferences. In most cases, advertising contains elements of both information and per-
suasion. In the pharmaceutical market, for instance, sales representatives may inform the
physician about the existence and the characteristics of a new drug, but at the same time
sponsor conference trips, oﬀer gifts, free samples, etc., which may be of a more persuasive
nature. From a viewpoint of social welfare, informational advertising brings an obvious
social benefit in the sense that a larger fraction of consumers becomes aware of a product
that may yield a positive net utility if consumed. On the other hand, the potential for
socially beneficial persuasive advertising is far less obvious. In the subsequent analysis,
we assume, in line with the specific example of the previous section, that advertising is
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purely informational, and ask whether restrictions on advertising can be beneficial for
social welfare even in this case.
When evaluating welfare eﬀects, we make use of the standard welfare measure, which
is an (unweighted) sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus net of third party payments.
Assuming that third-party funds can be raised in a non-distortionary manner, the social
welfare function simplifies to (gross) aggregate consumer utility net of R&D and marketing
costs. Since the outcome of the R&D competition is uncertain, the relevant measure
of social welfare is in expected terms. Denoting aggregate consumer utility in market
structure z by Uz, expected welfare, on general form, is given by
W = θUS + (1− z1 − z2)US + z1
¡
UM −K
¡
AM2
¢¢
(34)
+z2
¡
UD −K
¡
AD2
¢¢
− C (x1)− C (x2)−K (A1) .
In the following, we apply the informative advertising model introduced in the previous
section. We use the Hotelling interpretation of the model, with linear transportation costs,
where the two drugs are located at the endpoints of the Hotelling line. Let v denote
the gross utility of consuming a drug, while t is the cost per unit distance between the
actually consumed drug and the consumer’s ‘ideal’ drug. Whereas v can be interpreted
as the eﬀectiveness of the drug treatment, t can be interpreted as a measure of potential
side-eﬀects and contraindications. We also assume full market coverage, i.e., no consumers
refrain from buying the existing product(s).
It is now straightforward to derive the expressions for ex post consumer utility in the
diﬀerent potential market structures. For simplicity, we assume full third-party payment
of drugs.27 ,28 In the single-product case, where neither firm succeed in developing the new
27Since social welfare does not depend on prices, the assumption of full third-party payment makes the
exposition easier without aﬀecting the result.
28With full third-party payment, the assumption of full market coverage is equivalent to imposing a
restriction v − t ≥ 0.
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drug, aggregate consumer utility is given by
US = A1
Z 1
0
(v − ty) dy = A1
µ
v − t
2
¶
. (35)
In the multi-product case, where either the incumbent or the entrant discovers the new
product, aggregate consumer utility is given by
UM = UD = A1 (1−A2)
Z 1
0
(v − ty) dy +A2 (1−A1)
Z 1
0
(v − t (1− y)) dy (36)
+A1A2
ÃZ 1
2
0
(v − ty) dy +
Z 1
1
2
(v − t (1− y)) dy
!
= [A1 +A2 − 2A1A2]
µ
v − t
2
¶
+A1A2
µ
v − t
4
¶
.
Observe that aggregate utility is constituted by two qualitatively diﬀerent segments; the
fraction of partially informed consumers, i.e., Ai (1−Aj), and the fraction of fully informed
consumers, i.e., A1A2. Partially informed consumers buy the only drug that they are aware
of, with the corresponding aggregate mismatch costs t/2, while fully informed consumers
choose the most ‘suitable’ drug treatment, generating aggregate mismatch costs equal to
t/4. It clearly follows that the social benefit of developing a second drug in the market is
monotonically increasing in t.
Using the same cost and success functions as in the previous section, an explicit ex-
pression for expected social welfare can now be found by inserting these, along with (35)
and (36), into (34). In order to evaluate the welfare eﬀect of a strict governmental policy
towards pharmaceutical marketing, our strategy is to evaluate social welfare, as given by
(34), for the numerically derived equilibrium levels of R&D and marketing in the previous
section. In doing so, we interpret the advertising cost parameter k as a measure of the
extent of marketing regulation. This parameter measures the cost of reaching a certain
fraction of the consumer population through advertising. It seems reasonable, then, to
interpret a high (low) value of k as reflecting extensive (few) restrictions on advertising.
All else equal (i.e., for given levels of marketing and R&D), a higher value of k will of
28
course reduce welfare, since informing a given fraction of consumers becomes more costly.
The question, though, is whether the firms’ marketing and R&D decisions might be influ-
enced in a way that leads to an overall increase in social welfare. A numerical example is
provided in Table 5.
Table 5: Social welfare.
c = 1 c = 3
p k = 5 k = 8 k = 5 k = 8
1 0.254 0.158 0.246 0.153
2 0.237 0.152 0.240 0.152
3 −0.117 −0.057 −0.048 −0.021
4 −0.969 −0.477 −0.676 −0.375
Assumptions: θ = 1/10, v = 3, t = 1
One should of course be careful about drawing any strong conclusions based on a
specific numeric example. Nevertheless, a clear pattern emerges from this example. The
social loss of imposing more restrictions on drug marketing (i.e., increasing k from 5 to 8 in
this example) is larger when drug prices are low. However, if p becomes suﬃciently high,
increased marketing restrictions is actually beneficial for social welfare, even if advertising
is purely informational. In other words, strict restrictions on advertising are desirable only
in health care systems with very generous price regulation (or patent protection).
Intuitively, this tallies well with our previously derived results. Generous price regu-
lation (high p) strongly increases advertising incentives, relative to R&D incentives. In-
creasing the restrictions on advertising will directly reduce the incumbent’s incentives
to advertise, and thereby indirectly spur R&D incentives, which might improve welfare
through lower expected mismatch costs in equilibrium. This is clearly observed for the
cases of p = 3, 4 in Table 5. Several numerical simulations with diﬀerent parameter values
produce similar results.
In terms of (tentative) policy recommendations, our exercise suggests that a generous
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price regulation (or patent) system should be matched with strict regulation on advertising,
and vice versa.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed how a patent-holding pharmaceutical firm may strategically
use advertising ex ante to aﬀect R&D investments in new drugs, and thereby change the
probability distribution of future market structures. In doing so, we have explored the
basic idea that a generous patent system may provide incentives for patent-holding firms
not only to spend resources on R&D to obtain new patents, but also to spend resources
on marketing to protect existing patents. In this final section of the paper, we will not
recapitulate our results in detail, but instead provide some discussion of a couple of key
assumptions.
While the assumption of drug demand being insensitive to prices is appropriate for
most pharmaceutical markets, the additional simplifying assumption that the price is equal
for the old and new drug in the therapeutic market is not so obvious. However, while a
relaxation of this assumption is likely to aﬀect the relative strength of R&D and marketing
incentives, it does not aﬀect the main mechanisms of the model. A higher expected price
for the new drug will — all else equal — stimulate R&D incentives for both firms. This
suggests that it might be relatively less important for the incumbent to spend resources
on marketing in order to protect the existing patent rent. However, a higher price for
the new product also means that a potential entrant — if successful in obtaining the new
patent — will advertise this drug more heavily in the second-period duopoly, which, in turn,
increases the incumbent’s loss in case of entry. Consequently, this gives the incumbent a
stronger incentive — all else equal — to use first-period advertising as a strategic instrument
in order to reduce the probability of incurring such a loss. The relative strength of these
eﬀects is a priori uncertain.
The analysis rests on the crucial assumption that the eﬀect of advertising persists over
time. If this was not the case, there would be no demand-side link between marketing
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and R&D, and the two decision variables would be strategically independent. While the
standard assumption in the strategic advertising literature — that the eﬀect of advertis-
ing is infinitely durable — is obviously unrealistically strong when taken literally, it may
nevertheless be a useful simplification that captures an important aspect of advertising.
In reality, the eﬀects of advertising are neither completely instantaneous nor infinitely
durable, but somewhere in between. The question is rather how strong the persistence
eﬀect is. The basic idea explored in our analysis only requires that there is, to a certain
degree, a persistence eﬀect. Obviously, the weaker this persistence eﬀect is, the more costly
it is for the incumbent firm to use first-period advertising strategically in order to aﬀect
R&D expenditures and thereby the probabilities of second-period market structures.
Finally, it should be mentioned that we have focused on non-drastic innovations. A
natural extension of the model would be to allow the firms also to choose drastic innova-
tions (i.e., discovery of completely new products) and analyse the choice between drastic
and non-drastic innovations. This is a topic for further research.
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Appendix
The Jacobian from the R&D game.
From (17) and (18), we can derive
|J | =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
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.
We see that |J | > 0 provided that the first term is either non-negative or suﬃciently small
in absolute value.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part (i) and (ii): Since the denominators of (32) and (33) are equal, it is suﬃcient to
compare the numerators to decide the ranking of x∗1 (A1) and x
∗
2 (A1).
x∗2 (A1)− x∗1 (A1) ≥ 0
m
∆ := 8A1kc (4− 3A1)− p2A1 (2−A1)3 ≥ 0. (A.1)
By inspection of (A.1), it is easily verified that limA1→0∆ = 0. This establishes part (i)
of the proposition.
To prove part (ii) of the proposition, we evaluate ∆ at the lower bound of c, i.e.,
c := p2/4k, yielding the following:
lim
c→c
∆ = A21p
2
£
6 (1−A1) +A21
¤
> 0 for any A1 > 0.
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Since ∆ is increasing in c, it must hold that x∗2 (A1) > x
∗
1 (A1) for any c > c and A1 > 0.
Part (iii): From (32) and (33) we derive:
∂x∗1 (A1)
∂A1
= − 128p
2ck (4kcμ− σ)³
128c2k2 − p4 (2− 3A1 (2−A1)) (2−A1)2
´2 (A.2)
and
∂x∗2 (A1)
∂A1
= −
8p2 (2−A1)
¡
128c2k2ψ + φ
¢³
128c2k2 − p4 (2− 3A1 (2−A1)) (2−A1)2
´2 , (A.3)
where
μ := 32ck (1−A1)− p2 (2−A1) (8− 3A1 (5− 2A1)) ,
σ := p4 (1−A1) (2−A1) (3A1 (3 +A1 (A1 − 3))− 4) ,
ψ := 4ck − p2 (1−A1) (3− 2A1) ,
φ := p4 (1−A1) (2−A1)3
¡
12ck − p2
¢
.
We observe that ∂x∗1 (A1) /∂A1 < 0 and ∂x
∗
2 (A1) /∂A1 < 0 if the numerators are positive
in (A.2) and (A.3), respectively. Since the values of both numerators are increasing in c,
it suﬃces to make an evaluation at the limit c→ c. Straightforward computation yields
lim
c→c
(4kcμ− σ) = p4A21
¡
22− 36A1 + 18A21 − 3A31
¢
> 0 for A1 ∈ [0, 1]
and
lim
c→c
¡
128c2k2ψ + φ
¢
= 2p6A21 (2−A1) (5−A1) > 0 for A1 ∈ [0, 1] .
It follows that ∂x∗1 (A1) /∂A1 < 0 and ∂x
∗
2 (A1) /∂A1 < 0 for c > c and A1 ∈ [0, 1]. Q.E.D.
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